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The argument of exactly how much foreign exchange 
the country earns and what part of this actually 
accrues to the public sector is important, but it 
is not allembracing. Equally, if not more, impor­
tant are the ideological factors. Is the develop­
ment arising from investment in the tourist indus­
try helping to create a socialist Tanzania? Is 
the expenditure justified in view of our ultimate 
objectives?
2- Editorial Comment, Standard 
Dar es Salaam, 25 May, 1970
I
The development of tourism and, much more critical, tourism 
and development require much more systemic, systematic, realistic, 
and reasoned discussion than they have had to date in Africa. 
Excessive attention to micro project detail, astounding wishful 
thinking, and bland refusal to assess macro consequences seriously 
has typified most advocates. (3) The macro systemic analysis of 
opponents has usually been a slightly odd combination of an 
exceedingly intellectual, austere, and even apocalyptic view of 
the requirements for radical socio-political and political economic 
transformation linked increasingly with the assumption that the 
Caribbean tourist industry at its worst is the only model for 
Africa and that, therefore, no socialist solution seeking state 
could possibly give serious consideration to developing a tourist 
industry. (4) ot surprisingly, the result is a pseudo dialogue 
more often than a real one, because the parties are not really 
addressing themselves to the same issues and each is often quite 
genuinely unable (or unwilling) to understand what the other is 
saying.
Several preconditions to a serious dialogue and a scientific 
examination of issues - much less the acceptance of a strategic 
choice or a tactical synthesis - can be identified : first, a
less hysterical tone with less brandishipof tourism as a 
diabolis (or dous) ox machina would facilitate communication. 
Second, acceptance that tourism (at least foreign tourism) can 
hardly be an end in itself should lead to the realization that 
its total consequences in actual African socio-political and 
political economic settings must be evaluated before rushing 
ahead to design and activate specific projects and packages.
Third, the structural economic environment (including its probable 
near turn shifts) must be set beside proposed tourist industry 
development if sound assessments of even narrowly economic gains 
and losses are to be reached and much more if a foundation for 
comparing economic (including macro economic such as net import 
capacity for producer goods) gains - if any - with socio and 
political economic costs - if significant - is to be laid. Fourth, 
imaginative reassessment of what patterns of tourist development 
are possible in ^Jrrica today - drawing from, but not copying, 
alternative tourist industry patterns from industrial and non­
industrial, socialist and capitalist states - is a prerequisite 
for serious analysis of systemic as well as micro effects v/hether 
direct or indirect.
II
It is probably worth trying to elaborate each of the four 
points made as part of a collective approach before considering 
the last three in separate sections. Certainly they are not 
separable either in the sense that one can be dealt with 
independently of the other three or that one can be dealth with 
first, another second, and so on in the linear programming typo 
of sequence so beloved of theoretical planners who mistake the 
simple, ordered reality of mathematics for the complex,inter­
locking reality of political economy. The process must be 
iterative. (5) Tedious as that may be, it is the only way to 
maintain a resolution among aims and programmes, macro and micro 
considerations (whether social, economic, or political in primary 
content), and observed results compared with expected outturn and 
therefore (presumably) influencing present and future action.
To present tourism as a deus ex machina superior to manufactur 
ing and capable of serving as the central engine to spur growth and 
development is, under African conditions, patently absurd. (6) 
Foreign tourism (7 ) is a relatively high capital/output ratio, 
moderate capital/labour ratio, high import content, high infra­
structure and skilled manpower demanding export oriented luxury 
consumer goods industry based on natural resources (e.g. beaches, 
mountains, game, sunshine) and low cost labour. In these respects 
it rather resembles meerschaum pipe manufacturing on the one hand 
and electrical machinery assembly for export on the other. Its 
major difference is that the export is consumed in the exporting, 
not the importing, country. (8) Major socio-economic and political 
economic consequences do flow from that difference, as do potential 
variations in economic linkage and domestic market possibilities.(9
Export oriented industries with limited local supply or market 
linkages can fuel growth and some degree of socio-political develop 
ment. Singapore is an evident example and Mauritius may have 
little choice but to follow. But the natural resource (space) 
tourist requirement means that no densely populated country can 
depend primarily on tourism (vide Singapore again) and no realistic 
assessment of the likely numbers of foreign tourists to Africa 
would suggest that any but the tiniest states could specialize in 
it anyhow because of market limitations on the demand side. Iven 
Gambia (as opposed to the Banjul agglomeration), Lesotho (1C), and 
Tunisia can hardly hope to make tourism the dominant engine of 
domestic economic growth even if they can less unrealistically 
see it as playing a major role in incremental foreign exchange 
earning (import capacity boosting).
Economically, then, tourism is an export oriented industry 
which must be evaluated against other means to enhancing import 
capacity or reducing the need for it. In a broader context, once 
an overall view on political and social aims and their embodiment 
in economic structures is taken,the same comparison is appropriate 
including the special social and political consequences of foreign 
tourisms near unique nature as an export consumed at home.
Diabolis ex machine fears also seem either rather overblown 
or somewhat internally inconsistent. The very lack of scale - 
especially relative to the size of the host states - should save 
Africa from "Caribbeanization" as exemplified by 1950's Havanna. 
Clearly there are demonstration effect consequences socially, 
politically, and economically, but to relate these solely to 
tourism (1 1 ) or to sec tourism as the core of foreign espionage 
(or espionage as the core of tourism) (12) is simply silly and, 
more critical, counterproductive.
The argument that foreign tourism in a dependent state dominat­
ed by foreign and domestic bourgeois interests v/ill benefit foreign 
and domestic bourgeois interest, exacerbate inequality, and provide 
few (or negative) gains to broad groups comprising the majority of 
the population is evidently valid; as it is valid for any type of 
economic change such a state and its ruling alliance seek to 
further. The argument that tourism is worse because it degrades 
more, or reinforces dependency structures to a degree greater than, 
ether activities supported by such a state is a very different one 
and one much harder to prove. Was Havanna worse than Port au Princ 
in the late 1950's? Did tourism delay revolution in Cuba and has 
its absence increased the chances for meaningful change in Haiti? 
Equally it is hardly self evident that foreign tourism conducted 
dominantly through public sector institutions in a state seeking 
a transition to socialism has the same results as dependent foreign 
private controlled tourism in a neo-colony - Bulgaria, Yugoslavia"
Rumania, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia may all have assessed 
the consequences wrongly or may all be dependent capitalist states, 
but it is hardly reasonable to start with that as an unstated, 
unexamined premise (14).
The rather different line of attack, that with limited excep­
tions tourism either does not generate investible surpluses of 
any consequence or has internal dynamic which require that all 
such surpluses and more (extracted from elsewhere in the economy) 
be ploughed back for an indefinite period, is rarely made. If and 
when true (which, in Africa, is probably much more often than is 
supposed), such a conclusion would almost certainly lead to a 
discovery that net foreign earnings were negligible (15) and that 
no serious micro or macro economic case for it existed (16). This 
gap in the argument -- at least in Africa (17)- illustrates the 
tendency of the opponents to take an overly long term and theore­
tical view and equally the rash optimism of the. proponents. (13)
The socio-political setting of a country should effect the 
decisions taken in respect of tourism, as of any other economic 
sector. Foreign tourism is likely to affect domestic demand 
patterns both in the broader sense of the demonstration effect 
(for building and services as well as consumer goods) and in the 
narrower of actual inputs into the industry (including investment 
in domestic production capacity and infrastructure as well as 
imports and buildings). It will have psychological implications. 
Even though the widely asserted "subservience effect" may be 
overstated, as may the degree to which tourism is central to 
perpetuating cultural dependency or the belief in technological 
and technical inferiority, the problems are not trivial. Similarly, 
a significant "grievance effect" is likely, especially among 
relatively privileged citizens whose attitudes toward anyone 
enjoying a standard of consumption thev cannot afford are likely 
to be quite as mixed at their attitudes toward greater egalita­
rianism. (1 9)
Political economic macro effects require equally careful 
analysis in a national setting. It is necessary to examine not 
only what the net benefits (if any) of tourist development to the 
overall economy are likely to be, but also which institutions, 
sectors, and sub-sectors will acquire net gains and which suffer 
actual losses. The issue of private vs. public and resident 
foreign ("domestic") vs national is likely to be particularly 
critical. Among the potential gains (or losses) government 
revenue and foreign exchange will require particularly close 
attention while among the macro costs the opportunity (alternative 
use) cost of investment in tourism (direct and infrastructure) 
m i l  be the more critical the larger the actual or proposed sector.
Evidently the form of foreign tourist sector development and 
operation can be adjusted to fit more closely into, and to serve 
more effectively in reinforcing national socio-political and
political economic forces,, trends, and aims. However, there are 
two limitations. The product must - by definition- be saleable 
to foreigners at a price and a cost resulting in a national 
surplus or the whole endeavour is counterproductive. Further, 
one cannot operate a tourist sector radically incompatible with 
the basic socio-political and political economic setting for 
long without a massive confidence trick and a grave danger of at 
least a minor explosion. It is not useful to say tourist develop­
ment in Kenya reinforces the local bourgeoisie; otherwise it 
would not be promoted by the governing alliance. It is to the 
point to say it promotes conflicts of interest, suspicion of abuses 
of office, and misdirection of investment unacceptable even in the 
Kenyan system (the Minister after all has just lost his seat 
because such accusations were accepted by his constituents) and 
regulations framed and enforced to prevent or limit such features. 
Equally to propose unregulated, foreign private sector controlled, 
government subsidized tourist development in Tanzania (as the 
International Finance Corporation of the World Bank did a few years 
ago) is to misread totally the degree to which special enclave 
sectors are socially or politically acceptable to TANU or the 
government. (20)
At the sectoral and micro levels, the actual economic structure 
and environment require examination in relation to bot.i general 
and specific proposals. How much linkage with the other sectors 
of the economy would there be? How high an import content? How 
heavy a call on scarce domestic resources (including high and 
medium level manpower)? How significant an upgrading of payments 
to less scarce domestic resources? (21) What will be the altera­
tion in structures of production and in the divergence between 
domestic production and national use? What will the actual gain 
in national (not simply domestic) value added be and What will be 
the contribution to national investible surplus. Only if these 
questions are asked and answered can satisfactory micro analysis 
of projects be carried out, especially if there is any desire (as 
there should be) to compare foreign tourist development with similar 
export raising projects and with import substitution. (22)
Finally some examination of alternative patterns of foreign 
tourist sector development (and if its possible linkage to domestic 
tourist development) is important. The experiences of an array 
of countries from Antigua to Yugoslavia, Bulgaria to Zambia, 
Czechoslovakia to Spain should be studied with particular atten­
tion to countries whose geographic location, probable tourist 
market, and social-political-cconomic structures are relatively 
similar to ones own. The goal is not copying but the identifica­
tion of strong and weak points to select, adapt, guard against or 
avoid. This can apply to institutions, promotion, contact with 
other sectors of the life of the host country, facilities, proba­
ble levels, distribution and time patterns of costs and benefits, 
infrastructural and personnel requirements.
These stops should precede planning of, and commitment to, 
any major tourist sector development; especially to commitments 
to provide cheap Services, capital, and infrastructure cum fiscal 
incentives for its foreign development. The analysis of the socio­
political and political economic framework is vital to considering 
whether tourism is compatible with development as seen by the 
decision taking group of the state (23) and if so what levels and 
types of tourism under what conditions. The evaluation of economic 
gains and losses is rational only within such a framework but - 
once the framework is identified - the economic analysis is 
critical to seeing what projects and project clusters (if any) 
have net positive effects. To do that intelligently requires 
some knowledge of what project and policy patterns are likely to 
be technically and institutionally feasible and saleable. To 
start with cost/benefit analysis of a single hotel is ludicrous; 
never to undertake a cost/benefit analysis of alternative project 
and sectors within a socio-political and political economic 
frame which indicates what costs and benefits are relevant, is 
almost certain to be wasteful to the point of gross negligence.
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Socio-political and socio-economic effects of tourism arc 
hard to measure and are to a large extent, indirect. That is 
not a case for not identifying them, evaluating their probable 
level of significance, when they are undesirable seeking to 
limit them, and taking them into account in sectoral and micro 
evaluations. The whole in any major set of economic measures 
or projects tends to be significantly different from the sum of 
the parts derived from adding up micro-analyses, if only because 
interactions and broader concerns are hard to evaluate accurately 
at that level.
This particular field of evaluation is not primarily one for 
political economists (especially well paid expatriate ones) still 
less for specialized tourist industry analysts and least of all 
for tourist sector entrepreneurs (foreign or national private .or 
public sector). The reason political economists (or economists 
tout court) are deeply involved seems to be that they are less 
unwilling than historians, sociologists, political scientifists, 
and anthropologists to give fairly definite answers with resultant 
action proposals when politicians or administrators ask questions 
demanding such answers. In any event, someone has to tackle the 
coordinative and macro analysis otherwise either the field will be 
left to the still narrower (and inevitably biased) tourist analysts 
and entrepreneurs or to pure political and administrative intuition 
minus data to make it informed judgement. Unfortunately few
political economists outside major tourist areas (and none too 
many there) take the field very seriously, possibly illustrating 
Professor de Castro's point on a specialists' civilization which 
is rigidly scientific in detail but so narrow and fragmented as 
to suffer from social, cultural, and political myopia. (24)
One major consequence is the demonstration effect, an effect 
inescapably flowing from the fact that tourism is consumed in the 
exporting, not the importing, country and is consumed by a pre­
dominantly above average (by their own country's standards) 
income group living well above their own habitual standard. (25) 
The poorer and the more egalitarian the host state, the greater 
the contrast and the more serious the temptation to emulate the 
tourist ~ especially for the salariat which has more than enough 
money for necessities but far from enough to emulate the tourist 
life style. (26)
The problem is not one of occasional visits to tourist 
facilities in and of itself. It is the tendency to want to 
secure a consumption pattern similar to that of the tourists 
including demands that buildings (especially public buildings) 
and services (both private and public) be of the same quality 
tourists receive without any comparable willingness, or ability, 
to pay what tourists are (or should be) charged for them. The 
unproductive "investment" impact in high cost villas, office 
blocks, vehicles, and other consumer durables can easily exceed 
the cost of additional consumer soft goods and services, especial­
ly in scarce resource., terms. (27)
However, it is somewhat doubtful whether tourism is the do­
minant cause of demonstration effects under present or likely 
future conditions in most African countries. Resident expatriates 
(especially technical assistance personnel who live at much higher 
expenditure levels than senior citizens can afford and who make 
this abundantly clear) have a more profound impact. Any form of 
information flow on high income country - including much of 
socialist Europe - consumption and consumer investment patterns 
has similar, if perhaps less potent, effect- Only a nearly 
hermetic sealing of frontiers against movement of people and 
information (including people going abroad and returning) can 
remove the temptation; a simple curbing of a relatively small 
tourist sector is more like applying a band aid to a cut artery 
than a tourniquet.
The cure surely lies in achieving internalized national 
standards. Acceptable national patterns of consumption, of 
income distribution, and of living within ones means need to be
set, socially accepted, politically backed and internalized 
before much progress will be made. They may need to be backed 
by fiscal and sumptuary legislation actually banning certain 
luxury goods importation or local production, especially if these 
are very conspicuous- continuously import intensive in use - so 
expensive as to ruin the finances of many owners - damaging to 
development of alternative goods and services - sought for prestige 
as much as for genuine enjoyment. The prime candidate is evident­
ly the automobile purchased for purely personal use with no serious 
occupational or social need (28), but it is not the only one. This 
is, however, not to say that some regulation and limitation of 
exposure to flamboyantly different patterns may not be a critical 
part of building up such national standards and policies. (29)
"Lead us not into temptation" is sound practical advice for a 
broader audience than Christians and its invoker had fairly 
clearly a high resistance level to temptation.
The subservicence effect, too, is not really rooted in tourism. 
It arises from a belief that certain types of work are inherently 
degrading and that those who do them must be somehow subhuman. 
Certainly this is in large measure a colonial heritage which all 
too many African employers of domestic staff and patrons of service 
establishments (including "many university students and some radical 
intellectuals) have internalized all too well and demonstrate '.'11 
too clearly in their treatment of the people holding such jobs.(30) 
Some "job" are degrading - 3»g. prostitution- but to claim that 
about cooking, cleaning, sewing, and washing says more about the 
maker of the assertion than about the nature of the job. (31)
However, tourism does nothing to help any such reassessment 
of the dignity of all useful work and a fortiori of any human 
being who does a useful job to the best of his ability. The degree 
of subservience seems rather overrated (32) but the fact remains 
that the typical tourist is seeking uninterrupted relaxation and 
is not particularly human in his reaction to anything or anyone 
who irritates him. Equally he usually both has his own society's 
condescending attitude to service employees and is very quick to 
pick up the much more extreme attitudes prevalent in Africa.
A severe problem in some senses may be the warping of 
traditional crafts and skills. There is nothing wrong in presenting 
ci-ilturai performances as such (most countries take great pride in 
this during state visits and similar occasions) nor in weaving 
them into a genuine - if not wholly traditional performance (vide 
Cairo's Ballon Theatre) but there is everything wrong with 
presenting the same performance or, more frequently, tawdry 
imitations as examples of the "curious" and "primitive". Similarly 
genuine national art of traditional types (e.g. many Yaruba pieces) 
genuinely evolving artistic forms (e.g. much Maknnde sculpture and 
painting) and frankly commenii.al products which are not a debase­
ment of any tradition (e.g. Kamba animal carvings and Senegalese
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souvenir bags and necklaces) are no more to be condemned than 
commissioned art and multiply produced decorative pieces in 
general, but clear debasement of traditional art designed to 
pander to tourist 1 conceptions of Africa" (much West African 
carving and so called "Masai" masks) raises more serious problems 
psychologically, aesthetically, and in terms of the development 
of national artistic expression as a living force. (33)
The dependence effect is the psychological and cultural founda­
tion of the demonstration effect but is broader in encompassing 
ideological and other intellectual aspects not immediately reflect­
ed in consumption patterns. Again it would appear that tourism - 
unless it is a dominant sector - is unlikely to be the basic 
cause of the continuation of intellectual, cultural and ideologi­
cal dependence, dor is attacking tourism much better than a 
diversionary - at best a secondary - assault on the problem.
Educational reform., establishing a genuine national base for 
understanding - re producing- adapting - embodying technological 
and other technical knowledge, building and internalizing national 
ideals - ideological commitments - self confidence - self respect; 
these lie at the core of the problem.
To the extent tourism becomes self reliant in high and medium 
level manpower, uses more domestic inputs (particularly in build­
ings, furnishings, menus and entertainment), and is tied to domestic 
modes of travel (including national airlines staffed by citizens) 
it can contribute - marginally - to reducing the dependence effect. 
To the extent it is the reverse of all these things - e.g. Club 
Mediterranee - it will secondarily, but appreciably, aggravate it.
The grievance effect is either the product of one or more of 
the preceding effects or the result of real or believed losses 
from tourism. A demonstration effect or a dependence effect is 
likely to produce envy, frustration, and grievance: especially
in the absence of alternative internalized standards. An enforced 
subservience and treatment as less than human because of the job 
one does quite rightly gives rise to resentment and anger. The 
loss of fishing grounds, home sites, or farmland - especially 
if no or inadequate compensation, including acceptable alternative 
means of livehood, is provided - gives rise to perfectly normal 
and reasonable grievance albeit hardly ones unique to tourism 
or normally beyond the correction of any state interested in the 
welfare of its poorer citizens. (34)
A possible additional negative effect is the exploitation 
effect. This is the inverse of the dependence and subservience 
effects and can arise if the tourist is successfully exploited.
For example selling junk as art is a form of exploitation as is 
selling traditional dances as mod pornography. If the seller is
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quite cynical about the transaction, he is unlikely to feel 
debased but, like any variety of confidence trickster, he is 
likely to be socially and psychologically warped. In the 
strict Marxian sense no tourist industry which does not exploit 
tourists is sane for a poor country, but in the normal narrower 
use of the term to connote covert guile, deception, trickery, 
and cheating the pursuit of exploitation can be damaging.
The question of whether these ill effects can - or should - 
be cured by isolating tourists from the host country's society 
is a vexed one. Socialist European answers vary - the USSR and 
Bulgaria isolate a great deal; Hungary and Yugoslavia very 
little; China limits numbers so stringently that all contact is 
in carefully controlled settings.
One odd misconception needs clearing away. It is little more 
rational to say that foreign tourist facilities should be freely 
available to citizens (even if publicly owned) than to argue that 
luxury exports (especially those produced by public sector firms 
e.g. diamonds in Botswana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania) 
should be sold domestically. The difficulty is that foreigner 
only facilities - when tie foreigners are dominantly of a different 
ethnic group - is too reminiscent of colonial and South Agrican 
racism to be psychologically acceptable; a rational (high) 
pricing policy for tourist facilities is a less obgeCtionabl^. 
route. (35)
Separation can flow from contempt for, or fear of, host 
citizens. It can equally flow from distrust of, or contempt for, 
tourists and their values and, more particularly, the effect these 
can have on citizens values and life styles. In that sense 
separation is like limitations on the hours of bars, bars on 
addictive drugs (usually excluding caffem), sumptuary legislation 
proper and sky high taxes of a quasi-sumptuary nature. (36).
If separation is desired on these grounds, then scenic attraction 
(mountains, lakes, game parks) and beach siting of tourist faci­
lities well away from major cities is indicated as a policy which 
is probably posited by urban planning problems and rggicnal 
development needs as well, but which does raise infrastructural 
costs and transportation logistics difficulties.
The socio-political cases sometimes made for tourism are 
either weak, incompatible with securing any economic gains, or 
both. The first is provision of knowledge and understanding at 
some level of depth and complexity. Most tourists - including 
most tourists from socialist Europe (37) want no such thing. A 
vacation and a study tour may seem identical to the broadly 
concerned and habitually inquisitive intellectual, but they are 
world apart in the view of most (not all) other people. Doubtless 
all tourist programmes should provide some opportunities for such 
learning as options - albeit the logistics are difficult, the
enthusiam of most busy people for teaching tourists or having 
their worlc place shown to them is distinctly limited. -- but 
with fairly modest hopes-
Incidentally, many of the genuine learning oriented 
tourists have limited budgets and demands for luxury and will 
accept modest facilities. While there is little economic gain, 
if foreign contact on an individual level is desired these can 
be catered for in a domestic tourist programme. .JFricans do 
like to travel in their own countries; low cost facilities are 
essential to facilitating this; such a sector is providing an 
amenity (not a luxury) good and can have useful social and poli­
tical consequences; provision of domestic vacations is desirable 
(if probably not a priority) type of fringe benefit of employment 
(38) (vide socialist country practice); there is no need for such 
programmes, when properly planned, to need public subsidies.
Their absence is an indication of the satisfactory domestic 
facilities for elite internal travel and of elite preferences 
for foreign travel as much as lack of genuine demand,rather than 
one problem of public transport development is that planners 
and managers all drive cars and of private medical practice that 
it isolates the well paid from the realisties of the public 
system.
The body bumping thesis that simply moving people about 
creates tangible goodwill and serious understanding should be 
bankrupt but keeps recurring (39). Historic experience, common 
sense, or simply watching a typical group of tourists for a few 
hours should dispel any such illusion. (40)
1 1 .
IV
Political economic factors are rather easier to define 
clearly and to quantify (perhaps partly, but not wholly, because 
the author is a political economist). These fall into four 
major categories: types and levels of political economic gains
and costs, to whom the benefits will accrue and on whom the costs 
will fall, special, attention to foreign balance effects, and 
consequences in terms of economic structure and national economic 
integration.
Direct gains- take the form of citizens employment in tourist 
enterprises, the national (and perhaps the reinvested foreign 
domestic) investible surplus accruing to the enterprises, tax 
revenue collected from or through these enterprises and their 
employees including import duty. These are largely quantifiable 
after the event; both projections for existing units and for new 
ones are harder to do especially because this is a notoriously 
overoptimistic sector.
The employment impact is not very great unless the sector is 
very large or the country very small. 1)20-25,000 capital cost 
per job is a reasonable estimate for hotel enterprises, perhaps 
a little less for domestic travel and tour units. (41) For 
Comparison an integrated textile mill of moderate labour intensi­
ty has total investment (including working capital) of ,?12,500-
15,000 and a garment factory distinctly less. 100,000 tourists 
a year with an average stay of ten day might generate 5,000 
direct job aptd require direct investment of $100 million.
Wages are likely to run about 10% of tourist unit revenue, 
salaries (which may or may not be citizen) - 10%, and direct 
and indirect taxes perhaps 15 - 20% (42). These figures are not 
particularly high (or low) for light consumer amenity or luxury 
industry - they do underline the economic case for citizen 
skilled personnel and managers.
Domestic surpluses (whether on a unit cash basis or 
adjusted downward for wear and tear and upward for interest) 
are not likely to be very high in relation to capital employed 
for the sector as a whole, especially if relatively new and large­
ly foreign managed. Outstanding successes do exist but also 
major failures. The need for subsidized government loans, the 
long pre-profit period of many hotels, and the preference of 
major hotel companies for leasing or managing not building and 
owning hotels all point in this direction as do most of the 
micro and sectoral data the author has saen.
Indirect gains include additional local output (or higher 
returns for existing output) generated by tourist sector pur­
chases, indirect employment (including self employment) resulting 
from such production of goods or services, their contribution 
to national investible surplus, use by other..sectors of infra­
structure built for tourism. These are hard to quantify even 
after the event and little serious effort has been made to do so 
quantitatively in Africa. Proponents and critics alike overstate 
their cases and rely on assertion rather then evidence.
Domestic purchases are usually under 10% of sectoral revenue 
and netting out import content and diversion of resources the 
net can hardly exceed a third of that. It is concentrated in 
secondary food production, crafts, and fairly specialized services 
These probably do have low capital labour ratios but even so 
the indirect employment effect from this source can hardly 
exceed the direct. However, both the production and employment 
of indirect effects must be increased - perhaps by a half - to 
take account of the wage incomes paid by the central tourist 
establishments, and by something more on account of government
use of increased revenue. Perhaps 5 to 10% of sector revenue as 
a production gain and an indirect employment gain equal to 
direct would be reasonable estimates.
The surpluses of this type of enterprise are notoriously 
interlocked with labour income and/or notoriously hard to 
estimate or tax. The average national tax ratio (43) to 
domestic monetary sector income (about 15 - 20% in most of 
Africa albeit up to 35% in Tanzania) might be a fair guess i.e. 
under 2% of gross direct tourist unit revenue.
Costs - given that the benefits have (in the economic sense) 
been given net in most cases turn on either losses or scarce 
resource diversion. Funds for investment are scarce as is 
sophisticated building capacity. The tourist industry - contrary 
to popular mythology - has a relatively high proportion of high 
level (managerial, professional) and middle level (skilled 
manual, para-professional, clerical) manpower and needs elaborate 
training facilities (or an inordinate number of expatriates). 
These are even scarcer resources than investible funds and surely 
have shadow costs well above the actual wage abd salary rates.
The possibility of "investible deficits" (especially after 
allowing for interest on foreign loans and wear and tear) is a 
very real one; for a rapidly expanding sector, in Africa, it is 
a probability.
Indirect' costs include prevision of infrastructure primarily 
for the tourist industry. These may be partly offset by indirect 
gains accruing to other sectors using them. For isolated hotels 
these costs will be very high if they are provided with roads, 
water, electricity and not charged the fullcost of such special 
facilities (and they rarely are). Game reserves and parks are 
in a special category - conservation not tourism is their justi­
fication and it is perhaps more reasonable to view the costs as 
general to the country and revenue from fees to tourist enterpri­
ses as a gain. (44)
Clearly the most sectoral analysis of this kind can do is to 
identify about what the net impact on national product, employ­
ment, investible surplus, tax revenue will be. To determine whe­
ther - at this level- the sector is a candidate for expansion, 
maintenance, or curtailment spheres of economic activity and the 
present and potential results compared with those of the foreign- 
tourist sector.
The question "to whom" and "on whom" are critical in respect 
of gains and costs. In one respect they turn on income distrib1 - 
tion; in another on location of economic activity; in a third 
on private/public and foreign/ domestic ownership and control 
patterns. These are difficult issues to discuss in general 
because the distribution is moderately subject tp policy inter­
vention and because the likelihood of any particular type of 
intervention depends on the nature of the African state in 
question much more than on the nature of the tourist sector itself
Citizen staffing from the top down, public sector ownership 
and control of main units, an egalitarian pay and fiscal structure 
and a policy of locating units in game parks, mountains, and 
isolated beaches with emphasis on local food and services purchas ■ 
will allow tourism to fit into an egalitarian - poverty eradica­
tion - rural development oriented strategy - if such a strategy 
exists. It will hardly create or be one of the starting points 
of such a strategy.
Some tactical issues here are vexed. A medium and small 
scale African business (and even a large scale landlord e.g. 
hotel owning and leasing) class is not likely to be a real step 
toward economic independence because it remains dependent on 
foreign business. (45) Nowhere is that truer than in tourism. 
However, it is much more effective barrier to any transition 
to socialism or social democracy than a similar small and 
medium scale expatriate business class. Therefore, an interim 
phase of foreign private owned tourism (or no expansion of tourism 
may be appropriate in the context of a governing alliance favour­
ing either of these transitions. An independent African tourist 
industry - even in the context of a transition to national capi­
talism - will require a central public sector role at least to 
set a frame and to conduct negotiations with foreign tourist 
interests in a way which makes the smaller domestic private units 
dependent on the national public sector institutions not the 
foreign enterprises. (46)
The foreign balance impact of tourism is crucial. It is 
logically determinable but rarely calculated with much serious­
ness - a gap Agrican central bank research staffs might usefully 
try to fill. The Hast African estimates of sector import content 
in relation to gross receipts range from 20 - 40%. (47) Counting 
interest, wear and tear on imported elements of capital assets 
(or foreign loan repayment), foreign salary remittances and 
import purchases, profits remitted, and direct and indirect 
operational imports 40 - 50% seems reasonable as a long-term 
flow level but understates the ratio during a period of rapid 
expansion financed from domestic savings. For that reason, the 
average African per cent may well be over 50% (48). That is a
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high share for a domestic resource based export industry but 
not particularly so for a labour based export oriented manu­
facturing industry.
Two speical problems arise - how to treat the import content 
of additional real GNP and foreign exchange evasion loopholes 
opened by tourism. As any increase in GNP tends to raise imports 
and the genuinely local component of tourism probably does so not 
more than other increases, the first question really should be 
posed in terms of demonstration effect impact on the average 
incremental propensity to import and measures to control it. The 
second is less clearout. Tourists bring in foreign exchange and 
practically prevents requiring total conversion and balance recon­
version on arrival and departure. Therefore additional opportuni­
ties for foreign exchange leakage are inevitable. Alert checking 
(especially on hotels), speedy and well publicized prosecutions 
(especially of the citizen party to weaken the demand side by 
raising risks), and firm publicity to tourists can limit losses 
but cannot eliminate them.
The impact of tourism on national economic integration can be 
divided into, linkage (in Hirschman's sense) and balance (in 
Wurkse's or Rweyemamu's sense) 49 effects. Whether the former is 
significant or not depends very largely on policy backed by ima­
ginative study of possibilities. The latter is simply not an area 
in which tourism can contribute in a low income country because 
no significant domestic market (much less mass domestic market( 
industry in any real way unified with foreign tourist facilities 
is possible.
The import content of tourism will remain high until African 
economies have integrated, broadly based industrial sectors. (50) 
However, it can be lowered by up to one half by systematic 
requirements to utilize locally produced food, (51), beverages, 
textiles, furnishings, building materials, architects, contractors, 
airlines (52), and professional/manegerial staff. These are ; 
sectors in which additional demand from tourism will normally be 
secondary and can augment truly domestic demand to build a sounder 
production structure. A little creative imagination (linked to 
a sensible small industry strategy) could create furnishings of 
considerable quality and appeal from local materials at relatively 
low scarce resource cost and at prices often below imports. The 
same holds for building design.
Unfortunately these results presuppose a reversal of the 
lavish tax, expatriate work permit, import licence and other 
concessions all too usually given foreign tourist units. Such a 
shift could make tourist enterprises think again about local 
sources and lead to a re-education of citizen staff who have
internalized the foreign models all too well. This, in turn, 
is unlikely to occur except as a component of an overall national 
economic integration strategy - so long as most of the fruit in 
the Dakar medina is imported and the main furnishing and house­
hold ware shops are totally foreign in contents and almost so 
in senior staff, it is ridiculous to suppose that the Hotel 
Tarranga will utilize Senegalese food, furnishings, construction 
materials, or senior staff except as decorative frills or where 
(e.g. cement) imports are prohibitively more expensive. (53)
V
Some practical limitations of the tourist industry remain 
even if it passes the socio-economic and political economic 
macro tests for selective expansion. The first is its size 
relative to the overall economy in most African countries. The 
rather over-ambitious tourism section of Tanzania's Second 
Five Year Plan amounted to about 2\% of estimated gross investment 
and even adjusted for supporting costs not over 3%. As tourism is 
a high capital/output ratio sector - al least in Africa - the 
share of incremental GNP could hardly have exceeded 2% or #0.25- 
.30 per capita over five years. This is not to say tourism is 
irrelevcnt - the same results would appljf to any small sector - 
but to place it in perspective. (54 Tanzania is probably not 
atypical of .most African economies as to general orders of 
magnitude, although exceptions must bo recognized e.g. Gambia, 
Tunisia, Mauritius, Lesotho, and possibly Morocco and Egypt. (55) 
The limitations are partly on the demand side - Africa is an 
expensive place to reach and the number of people demanding 
special, new vists (or, rather absurdly, beaches), whatever the 
cost, is limited and at the moment probably suffering from a 
short term setback and very slow medium term growth. Over 90% 
of industrial economy tourists visit other industrial economies 
because it is cheaper and because personal or interest ties are 
inevitably closer and denser than those with poor countries.
On the supply side, the structural costs of allocating large 
(10% or above) proportions of investment potential, construction 
capacity, or high and medium level manpower to tourism are rather 
daunting unless continued external dependency and an increasingly 
peripheral export service material future is seen as inevitable 
(e.g. Seychelles'?) or desirable (e.g. Antigua?) by the decision 
making elite. Of course tourism may be much more critical for 
selected areas - a reason for keeping it out of main towns - e.g. 
the rather decayed historic centres of Bagamoyo and Kilwa in 
Tanzania and the surrounding rural areas could benefit signifi­
cantly from fairly modes scale beach plus historic site excursions 
(56).
The high capital cost of tourist facilities - now easily 
running #25-30,000 per tourist space provided including vehicles 
and infrastructure in East Africa and probably higher in West and
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Central - can be reduced with use of local materials and less 
wasteful designs but only selectively (for certain types of 
fishing lodges and camps) can it be cut by 25-50% as optimists 
believe. Tourism is selling comfort and relaxation in a setting 
not a setting plus austere (to the tourist) accommodation. Few 
tourists are intrepid explorers or passionate seekers of new 
vistas if discomfort is part of the price.
Perhaps more serious, the payoff is slow. Allowing two years 
for construction and three to build up a clientele (of tour 
sellers not of individuals who rarely choose independently for 
themselves as opposed to from an agent's or operators list of 
possibilities) means at least five years to relatively normal 
local payments and to breakeven on invested resources. That is 
in fairly optimistic picture if Kenyan and Tanzanian experience 
is typical. Admittedly the same is tru for most large projects 
(e.g. sugar mills 5 to 6 years, textile factories 3 to 4 on the 
supply side assuming adequate demand), but the waiting cost on 
investment should not be forgotten.
The tourist industry is unstable. It rather resembles 
primary products in that sense and is likely to have a similar 
time pattern of ups and downs rendering it of minimal use as an 
export cornering stabilization route. The 1955-1970 tourist 
explosion has ended. 1975 levels are likely to be well below 
1972-1974 averages and 1975-80 a period of low growth, excess 
capacity, and cutthroat competition among host countries. This 
is complicated by fashions in where to go which are very hard 
to predict and by the equal uncertainty as to the short term 
or the quantitative results of promotion.
The problem of high and middle level manpower demands has 
been cited earlier. Managers, data processors, accountants, 
logistical experts (for people and goods), purchasing officers, 
high quality salesmen, mechanical and electrical engineers, the 
business analogues to protocol officers, inventory controllers, 
public relations, specialists, skilled craftsmen, architects and 
designers, training officers, expert cocks, good drivers, 
knowledgeable and educated guides, aircraft personnel - the list 
is appalingly long and closely correllated to areas of acute man­
power shortages. The macro and micro costs of a bsically expa­
triate middle and top manpower cadre have been cited, but the 
alternative opportunity cost of creating local cadres rapidly and 
in large numbers should give pause to any advocacy of a tourist 
sector large in proportion to total national training facilities. 
Clearly micro calculations should be tested by using a shadow 
price of at least 150% on relevant wages and salaries but even 
that will not measure the systemic effects if - say - 10 to 20% 
of the relevant cadres are allocated (formally or via a free 
market) to foreign tourism.
There is a real danger that the sector will develop a self 
generating momentum in a particularly perverse way. If one
starts from a low base capital and startup costs will mean 
sectoral (as well as individual project) net foreign exchange 
drains and negative investible surpluses in early years. If 
the initial ventures then more into both foreign balance and 
investible surplus positive positions there will be a temptation 
to plough all these surpluses - and more - back into a new 
round of expansion. This may be quite sensible for the proprietor 
(even if he be a public institution) and doubtless builds up 
national assets and GDP but, at the national level, it keeps 
postponing the day when the tourist sector adds to, rather than 
substracts from, resources available to other sectors, That 
approach can be justified for dynamic basic wage, intermediate, 
or producer goods industries because these do increase citizen 
welfare directly and contribute to national economic balance, 
interlinkage, and development. For a supposedly supporting 
foreign exchange, tax revenue, and investible surplus generating 
adjunct to the economy it would appeal exceedingly difficult to 
defend. (57)
In a sense this brings the argument back to the initial 
sketch of the nature of the industry. It produces a luxury 
market export product for local consumption. Assuming its socio­
economic and socio-political consequences are acceptable or 
containable, it can be justified only if its net foreign exchange 
tax revenue and investible surplus (58) contributions exceed 
those of alternative export industries (59) and of import 
substitution (and are positive not negative). Whether these 
conditions can be met and a saleable product produced and market­
ed is a factual question for examination country by country and 
project by project. Even the sum total of positive answers 
is likely to yield a relatively small contribution to incremental 
(let alone total) net foreign exchange earnings and a still 
smaller one to national investible suprlus or product. An 
illustrative example of these and certain other points appears 
as . an annex.
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VI
It is worth looking briefly at some of the alternative 
tourist sector patterns (other than the ancient regime Havana - 
Port of Spain - Copacabana model) which might offer guidelines 
for African use and to note a few of the implications and 
problems of following each.
This is not to imply a copying or even a simple adaptation 
of any one strategy is ideal - elements from several plus parti­
cular new elements would probably suit any African country's 
needs rather better. (SO)
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The Chinese pattern involves controlled numbers of foreign 
visitors of controlled types with all contacts with citizens 
controlled. For these numbers special facilities are available 
entirely within the public sector and charges are at levels 
yielding an investible surplus. The sector is growing molderate- 
ly but is minute and preseumptively more a self supporting 
service to business (especially foreign trade and technology 
transfer) and foreign publicity than an economic activity in its 
own right.
The Bulgarian pattern is one of low to medium charge, high 
volume tourism centred on the Black Sea and other natural attrac­
tion resort areas. A three way division of the industry exists: 
domestic, soft currency (i.e. Socialist European), and hard 
currency (i.e. Western) with the last enjoying much better faci­
lities and services but quite tightly segregated from the general 
public and from the other categories of tourist. The sector is 
wholly public, has a low import content, and is clearly analyzed 
in terms of shadow foreign exchange prices (one for CMEA and a 
higher for convertible currencies) ad it almost certainly shows 
a bookkeeping loss in local currenc}/' terms on its Western and 
perhaps its socialist European sub-sectors. It is a large net 
foreign exchange earner in a fairly typical poor country primary 
product dominated export pattern.
Hungary offers a wide range of tourist service and price 
levels albeit little at the luxury end of the range. Its tourist 
sector is largo but is closely integrated into the domestic urban 
and established vacation area facilities and infrastructure. 
Tourists are not kept separate from domestic travellers or the 
general public. The direction and main units are public sector, 
some smaller service (and perhaps hotel) units are co-operative 
or private (family) owned. Again prices appear to be set to take 
account of a high shadow foreign exchange rate but, as the sector 
is under some compulsion to achieve moderate investible surpluses 
on its domestic costs and revenues, this is largely handled by 
special exchange rates for tourists not abnormally low prices 
chaged by tourist enterprises. The foreign exchange contribution 
is not insignificant, though lower than in the case of Bulgaria, 
and is in a basically manufactured goods export sector including 
vehicles and pharmaceuticals as well as processed foods and luxu­
ry consumer soft goods and household furnishings. Except for fuel 
the import Component is negligible.
Yugoslavia resemble Hungary in price range, in catering to 
large numbers of tourists, and in handling the shadow foreign 
exchange price by special conversion rates not ppecial low 
domestic currency prices. However, the tourist sector is much 
newer and more concentrated in new resort areas not integrated 
into existing structures. While domestic tourism is significant,
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foreign is dominant (Yugoslavia is considerably poorer than 
Hungary). Central government control of tourism is fairly 
limited; state (i.e. region), decentralized public sector 
self managed, co-operative, and private units are dominant.
In a number of cases minority foreign participation and manage­
ment has been sought or accepted. The foreign exchange contri­
bution is significant and is in the context of a weak physical 
goods export performance (mixed primary products and manufactures) 
propped by large remittances from Yogoslav workers in Western 
Europe. The import content is higher than that in Hungary 
because of a less integrated economic structure and than that 
in Bulgaria because of loss stringent import controls but is 
still probably below 10%, much of that fueld.
Some of the implications of these structures, if transplanted 
to Africa, can be sketched briefly. The Chinese pattern - even 
if modestly enlarged and operated on a higher amenity/higher 
price/higher surplus basis - would make tourism very insignifi­
cant indeed, rather analogous to one export industrial plant 
or a group of artistic and craft expert workshops (e.g. wood 
and ivory carving (62)). The gain would be yet further limited 
by the high (absolutely and in contrast to China where it 
approaches nil) import content. Certainly negative macro-effects 
would be limited indeed and time given for building a national 
tourist industry cadre with a view to subsequent expansion when 
import content might be lower, alternative export options 
scarcer, and the national standards more firmly internalized (63)
The Bulgarian model poses different problems. Mass low 
charge tourism is unlikely to yield either adequate rates of 
investible surplus or significant foreign balance gains given 
African capital costs, import content, and manpower gaps (lead­
ing to numerous expatriates if mass tourism is sought). Equally 
the degree of segregation of tourists practiced by Bulgaria is - 
at least for large numbers - quite beyond the capacity of 
nfrican states to co;,y. (64)
The Hungarian system seems inappropriate to any African 
state other than Egypt because the established urban and old 
resort facilities and infrastructure and the volume local 
tourism do not exist. (65)* The handling of the foreign exchange 
shadow price by a special exchange rate (putting the burden 
squarely on the government and avoiding arguments about automatic 
subsidies to tourist units) is worth consideration .
The Yugoslav pattern is, on the face of it, the most easily 
adaptable at least for Mediterranean Africa; for sub-Sahara 
.ifrica the ccst of airfares means that mass demand at viable 
prices probably does not exist. However the fact that Yugoslav 
manpower availability and economic integration are much higher 
means that such an adaptation would be much less linked to the
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rest of the economy and a much feebler net foreign earnings 
generated in Africa than in Yugoslavia.. Further, Yugoslavia's 
decentralization ~ even with a stronger national framework, 
ideology, and party than exists in the vast majority cf African 
states - has often led to amazingly cross purpose decisions 
and to opportunities Jbr external exploitation and/or penetration. 
Given the rather lesser experience and toughness of pobable 
iifrican private or public sector unti negotiators (as contrasted 
to Yogoslav), very real dangers of wholesale unequal exchanges 
and foreign penetration would arise. (65)
On the face of it sub-Saharan African states should seek 
specialty, limited number, high charge tourism. This may well 
be less tri-ie of Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco who should be able 
to reduce import content and foreign manpower inputs much more 
readily and who can charge higher prices for any grade of faci­
lity because transport costs from Europe are much lower. Such 
a sector would necessarily seek tourists globally - not from 
Europe alone — and via high quality/high cost arranged tour 
agencies and travel agents who arrange trips for individuals, 
not via the cut price dealers like the late Court Line group.
It is fairly clear that the socio-economic and socio-political 
costs of tourism, and even more the difficulty of limiting 
them, rises more than in proportion to the number of tourists 
relative to that of the country. The more limited numbers will 
fit into relatively isolated hotel complezes with some ease; 
mass tourism will not vide Malindi/Mombassa and Banjul. Further 
the ratio of charges to facilities seems to be much higher at 
the upper end of the market and the tendency to cyclical fluc­
tuations potentially less severe. The resource misdirection 
dangers, and those of needing to use foreign resources extensive­
ly, as to manpower and investment, would be curbed by the smaller 
sector size and, if prices were higher, the ratio of surplus 
to investment raised, v/ith smaller demand the possibilities of 
seeking out and building up local inputs from small scale pro­
duction units would rise reinforcing the reduction of foreign 
exchange drain achieved by lower foreign financial and manpower 
inputs.
It is quite true that a large proportion of the - quite limit­
ed - number of genuinely potential visitors who wish to learn 
to understand African realities could not afford these rates. 
However, they arc the one group who would accept facilities 
at a utility standard designed for a moderate income African 
internal tourism and travel sector. Such a sector is not 
justified for them but it has claims to some priority in its 
own right and could accommodate them.
The need for a central framework emerges from all these 
patterns - perhaps less clearly from the Yogoslav. Because 
of the knowledge and business power of foreign tourist enter­
prises and the high costs of promotion and infrastructure a
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state negotiating and financing role is inevitable if any 
sent'lcnco of national control over the direction of development 
or division of gains is to be maintained. (66) For the broader 
systemic reasons outlined above, the state role should be much 
broader and lay down guidelines and frameworks within which 
tourism development is acceptable and barriers and constraints 
to unacceptable patterns. The nature of financial and management 
requirements is such that large units are needed. In practice 
these can bo public sector or foreign private sector controlled •• 
local private ownership will, infect, mean foreign control. (i'7) 
Smaller units can be decentralized public or local private or 
even mixed foreign—domestic with limited macro impact if the 
central framework and institutions are national public sector 
controlled. In tourism, as in most other sectors, it is only 
too clear that - whatever ones desires - capitalism in Africa 
will rarely if ever be African capitalism and then only if it 
is dependent on an African public sector which is genuinely 
.African in control and aims as well as personnel. (68)
VII
At least a few conclusions do flow from the foregoing ana­
lysis :
A. The foreign tourist sector should be evaluated in the pers­
pective of national social,political, and economic aims, 
structures, history, and trends not simply in sectoral or 
micro economic terms.
B. From such an approach key questions as to who and what 
sectors should benefit and whether that result is attainable 
can be asked (assuming that the analysis at "A" does not 
rule out tourist development at least for the time being
as it has to date in the cases of China, the Korean Democra­
tic Republic, and the Peoples Republic of Vietnam) and 
answered.
C. After these two stages have been accomplished, a general 
set of guidelines for the foreign tourist sector can be 
worked out. Vi thin (and only within) such a context meaning­
ful micro analysis of costs and benefits, of net foreign 
exchange impact of investment requirements and probably 
investible surplus generation, of linkage effects and de­
mands for scarce resources can be carried out for individual 
projects.
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Do After the micro-analysis the tourism options should be
compared with alternative export oriented goods production 
possibilities in particular and with other foreign balance 
improving projects in general.
E. It is likely that the analysis will suggest some tourism
development is desirable in most African countries but that 
in few should it play a major role even in foreign exchange 
generation. This is a conclusion based as much on the demand 
side as on social and political or economic desirability 
considerations on the supply side.
P. Given the levels of knowledge, personnel and finance
necessary to deal with foreign tourist interests on anything
like an equal basis, the main African institutional units will 
need to be public sector or they will be de facto foreign 
controlled whatever their formal ownership. Smaller units 
will be dependent on larger so that their ownership is 
normally less critical.
G. Mass market tourism maximizes risks, dangers of inadequate 
returns in relation to resources utilized, the risk grossly 
distorting the pattern and trend of the economy, and socio­
political and socio-economic costs. More attention should be 
paid to attempting to develop high charge, limited numbers 
types of tourism concentrated in areas of natural attractions 
where their local secondary effects will be more significant 
and the. socio -economic and socio-political stresses easier
to contain than in major urban centres.
H. Domestic tourism for gourps broader than a very small elite 
has little in common with foreign tourism. It is, however, 
a sector with some claim to attention in its own right and 
deserves more, and more seriously thought out, attention 
than it has received. (70)
a.
;J'JNEX
SCHEMATIC SECTOR.IL ANALYSIS
l\
Number of Foreign Visitors
Bed Bights
Total Expenditure
Lodging and Meals 
Domestic Tours/Travel 
Other
10 0 ,0 00  per year 
1 ,000,000 per year
5 5 0,000,000 per year
130 per day 
515 per day 
S 5 per day
Capital Cost of Industry (1974 Prices)
Hotels (5,000 beds)
Vehicles
Service Facilities 
Working Capital 
Public Infrastructure
Total Major Tourist Units
Capital Makeup
Domestic Loan (3%)
Domestic Bank (8%)
Foreign Loan (10%)
Foreign Equity 
Domestic Equity
B
Major Tourist Unit Revenue/Costs
Receipts
Wages
Salaries
Other Domestic Purchases
Operating/Maintenance Imports
Depreciation
Interest
Hotel Taxes
175 million 
,, 15 mi 1 1 i on 
510 million 
510 million 
510 million
5120 million
530 million 
510 million 
530 million 
5 5 million
545 million (including public 
infrastructure)
545,000,000 
4 , 500,000
4 , 000,000 
4 , 500,000 
1 6 , 250,000
7.500.000
6 .200.000
-> 9000,000
Total Costs 
Net Loss
45,950,000
950,000
b.
Operating Surplus 012,750,000
Loss ( 950,000)
Depreciation 7,500,000
Interest 6,200,000
Operating Surplus/Unit Capital 11.5%
Net Profit (Loss)/Unit Equity (-2)%
(Unit Capital and Equity there exclude Public Infrastructure) 
Direct Emoloyment 6,000
Capital/Labour Ratio 018,333
C
Foreign Outflow
Salaries (50-75%) 2 ,000,000 - 3 ,000,000
Domestic Purchases (10-20%) 450,000 - 900,000
Imports (less tax) 1 1 ,250,000 - 1 2 ,500,000
Depreciation (60-62/3%) 4,500,000 - 5,000,000
Interest (less tax) 2,625,000 - 2,625,000
2 0,8 2 5,000 - 24,025,000 
(47 - 53%)
D
Government Rovenuc/Expenditure — ■ --   ■ - - - —
Hotel Levy 4,000,000
Import Taxes 3,750,000 - 5,000,000
Domestic Input Taxes 450,pOO
Direct Income Taxes 1 ,000,000
Interest Remittance Tax (12-=,-%) 375,000
Indirect Income Tax * 1 ,000,000
10,575,000 - 11,825,000
* Banks - say - 850,000 other 150,000
Administration 1,500,000
Promotion 1 ,000,000
Maintenance Infrastructure 1 ,000,000
Cash Expenditure 3 ,500,000
Surplus for other uses 7,075,000 - 8,325,000
Less "interest" on Infrastructure 1 ,000,000______
"True Surplus" 6,075,000 - 7,325,OOC
c.
Employment (From ”.9.7 - 310.975m) 1,500
If total government revenue is - say -
350 0,000,000 this is 1 . 3  - 1 .5%
'7*
ill
Spread Gains
* Additional Payments Domestic 450,000
Factors (already in use)
New Production 1,125,000
Total 1,575,000
Additional Employment 2,000 - 2,500 
* 10% domestic purchases
** 25% domestic purchases
G:-.P Effect (Adjusted)
Wages 4 ,500,000
Salaries (25%) 1,125,000
Government Surplus 9say) 8,000,000
Spread Effects 1,350,000
Domestic Interest (less tax) 2,350,000
Total 17,325,000
If GDP is of the order of 31,500,000,000 this is 1.2%
Total Employment Generated 9,500 - 10,000
Applying a 40% activity ratio to a population of 15,000,000 
would be about 1 .5% of economically active citizens.
Foreign Exchange Effect
Gross Inflow 350,000,000
Sectoral Outflow (say) 23,000,000
Government Tourist Service
Outflow 1,150,000
Illicit Transactions (pro forma) 850,000
Total Outflow ,,25 ,000,000
Net Earnings 325,000,000
If gross foreign exchange earnings on goods and services 
total *6 5 0,000,000 and net *5 2 0,000,000 (20% average import 
content of exports which is fairly high if most exports are 
agricultural primary products) then tourism would produce 
7 3/4% of gross and 5% of net foreign exchange earnings.
H
National Invcstible Surplus (Gross)
* Tourist Units 6 ,450,0 0 0
National Financial Institutions 
(Pro forma) 1 ,200,000
Government (assuming 20% of net 
incremental revenue so used) 1 ,700,000
Spread Effect (10%) 135,000
Gross 9,485,000
Less Foreign Loan repayments (Pro 
Forma) 3 ,000,000
Net 6,485,000
If gross domestic savings are 20% of GDP this would be 2.1%
of a total of *3 0 0,0 0 0,000.
NOTES:
1. These figures are for a hypothetical economy similar to 
Tanzania, but they are not actual or even attempted 
approximate Tanzanian figures.
2. The domestic Financial Figures have been treated pro forma 
as *850,000 tax, *1 ,000,000 post tax profit, *1 ,3 5 0 ,0 0 0  
operating costs (including interest to depositer). Of 
the., latter *200,000 is assumed to be 'non-cash costs or 
interest Recipient savings.
3. The domestic Financial institutions and goods/services 
suppliers are presumed to be national (public or private 
sector) institutions or individuals and to employ few 
expatriates. Otherwise the Foreign Outflow will be higher.
4. The tourist sector is taken as operating normally with 
no new units in the breaking in phase.
No costs of expansion arc included. Evidently a 10% 
expansion of capacity would entail costs using up all the 
investible surplus and reducing the foreign exchange 
gain to .21 ,500,000 assuming ,,7 ,000,000 (of '.1 1 2 ,000,000 
total investment import content, ^3 ,000,000 from foreign 
loans, and ,,200,000 loan interest). Employment and G. P 
gains would be raised by the impact on construction.
These illustrative data seek to show the probable parameter 
of a modest sized tourist sector. They do not show how 
it compares with alternative sectors either on average 
or incrementally. Such comparisons would require similar 
parametric exercises for the other sectors and incremental 
programme analysis for them and for tourism along the 
general lines of this format.
Socio-political and socio-economic issues are presumed to 
have been resolved and the cost of limiting costs in these 
fields included in the cost structure. However, unavoided 
costs could be ehtered as offsets to sectoral surplus and 
GNP gains albeit that is an artificial way of handling them 
Public/private sector divisions will depend on main unit 
ownership. If this is dominantly national public then in 
this example about 80 - 95% of the net investible surplus 
would accrue to that sector. Foreign exchange control 
(including allocation) will determine whether basic (wage, 
producer), amenity, or luxury goods result from the foreign 
exchange surplus and which groups in the country benefit 
thereby.
1. Dr. Green is currently associated with the Institute of Developpment Studies at 
the University of Sussex. Prom 1966 through 1974 he was Economic advisor to the Tan­
zanian Treasury and Honorary Professor of Economics at the University of Dar es 
Salaam.
2. Reprinted in Tourism and Socialist Development. I.G. Shivje (editor), Tanzania 
Publishing House, Dar es Salaam, 1973, p.2.
3. Tourism and Socialist Dorelcpment illustrates both of these propositions. Frand 
Mitchell's contribution (pp 23-34) is breath-taking in the latter regard.
4. The systematic refusal of most critics to discuss the socialist European Tourist 
sector is, to say the liast, peculiar - and when tourism is being discussed in the 
context of, say, Tanzania or Algeria, commes close to being wilful distortion.
5. That is, one must proceed forward, backward, and sideways several times to secure 
an "answer" which is possible, internally consistent, and (in terms of the goals set 
when setting up the exercise) reasonably efficient.
6. This should be self evident but Mitchell cjd pit is an example that some academi­
cians argue otherwise even after doing research on the topic while "U.S. 'Think-tankers 
Develop Tourism For Africa" (Chistian Science Monitor. 15 December 1970, (pp 90-93
in Tourism and Socialist Development) illustrates similar views on the part of suppc— 
sedly-hard headed businessmen. Incidentally, A.D. Little was never commissioned tc 
write Tanzania's 10 years Tourist Plan, but to prepare detailed proposals for such a 
Plan. As it happens, there were largely rejected as unsatisfactory or socio-political 
and unrealistic en economic grounds.
7. Domestic tourism is a separate issue. Unless otherwise specified this paper treats 
foreign tourism. In a poor country what is likely ifco be desirable or practical for do­
mestic touris^ for more than a minute elite is unlikily to be saleable to most foreign 
tourists. Local elites (including resident foreigners) sometimes oppose large scale 
foreign tourism because it puhes charges to them for luxury goods and services to 
more reasonable (i.e. Higher) levels.
8. The difference is a major one. To discuss diamond miniag and cutting as directly 
analogous to tourism is to miss the point ; diamonds in Hatton Garden do not have the 
same impact in Dar es Salaam as tourist at downtown and beach hotels.
9. Because it is a "local expert" tourism does offer a protected market for local im­
pute. The institutional barriers to overcoming this should be surmountable - Florida 
oranges in Trinidad and Jaffa oranges in Dar es Salaam are economically absurd. The 
production pattern consequences of doing so in a large scale may, however, not be very 
satisfactory if the tourist goods are radically different from local market items.
10. Lesotho is a very special case. The tourists ate South African and the special 
attractions pornography, sex, gambling, and a less repressive atmosphere. The alterna­
tive employment - at present - would be in South Africa. Evidently neither has much
to commend it. See C. Winai-Strdm "The Influence of Multinational Corporations on . 
L^zothe's Politics and Economics", IDEP, CS/2562-14.
11. H.iti, after all, escaped a tourist boom under the late President Duvalier but 
exhibited oppression, repression, and exploitation at least as severe and economic de­
privation rather worse than that in Cuba under B tista.
12. For some reason this rather naive idea (not thar some tourists may be foreign agents 
but that tourism is essential or central to espionage) is a recurrent one. Several 
illustrations (and a common sense refutation at P. 73) can be found in To rism and 
Socialist Development.
13. Arguments that tourism ±3 income distribution equalizing (e.g. Mitchell) are 
unconvincing, especially when linked to wholesale denunciations of industrialization 
illustrated with "facts" flowing from an a parent conviction that markets usually 
reach walrasian equilibria, Paretian optima, and Lorenz curve equalization rapidly 
and effectively. Successful tourism is a high, not a low, surplus to capital employed 
and a relatively high salaries to wages ratio-sector.
14. CP pp 2-17 of Tourism and Socialist Development and- more notably as it was written 
after the question of socialist European tourist sectors had been posed squarely - 
Shivje's "Preface".
15. Many individual projects clearly fail to pass this test. A major IPC sponsored 
set of proposals in an E st African country rather less than an equal investment in 
the same general area in sugar production.
16. Nobody seriously claims positive demonstration effects for tourism which waauld 
outweigh i.t£ being an economic liability, at least not for a poor country.
17. Rather more detailed, literature on this topic exists for the Caribbean and sug­
gests relatively low net national value added effects and surplus generation rates.
18. Including those who really are putting up funds and have something to lose by 
bad judgment. Businessmen are net omniscient and the thought that the foreign party 
lost too is little return on wasted national resources.
19» This is particularly likely to be true of some (by no means all) university 
faculty ana students who often feel a need to justify their own very privileged 
status by being constructively radical and at the same time wish toAdo so in ways 
not likely to reduce their own welfare (such as proposals that they work with the 
rural population in Rational service schemes dc - witness the initial response in 
Tanzania, Ethiopia, and China).
20. The A.D. Little proposals tended to have the same drawbacks plus proposing 
tourist investment a t a level which appeared recklessly risky (a view latbr 
.vents have justified), and, more critically, inevitably resource dinerting
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21 . e.g. will domestic staff and other service industry employees earn more by 
moving to hotels ? Will wages in these sectors also rise ? Will prices of goods 
such as fillet steak rise because a larger specialty market exists and if so 
how much of the gain will get back to the cattle raiser ?
22. That a project is viable and desirable in both macro and micro terms is .a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for proceeding with it to be logical. 
For the latter, one needs to know what alternatives there are and how scarce 
total resources are - hopefully, mere projects meet minimum desirability and 
viability tests than there are resources to implement.
23. If one believes that decision taking group is itself incompatible with 
development (often a very reasonable belief), rather different issues arise.
Is change by transformation or mutation possible or is violent revolution 
essential ? In either case tourist development is likely to be a side issue, 
however, if one believes it sc harsly highlights contradictions and so grossly 
illustrates Fanon's vision ('Wretched of the Barth eg. p. 30) as to be desirable 
for speeding the day of judgement or that it so strengthens reactionary against 
progressive governing elite forces as to create negative evolution of class 
alliance power balances, then, tourist development remains relevant even in this 
context.
24. Geografia da Fame (Geography of Hunger), Cruzeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 1952.
25. This is not per se a criticism of the tourist ; a desire to relax, to rest, 
and to be confortafcle and free from cares from time to time is not abnormal or 
objectionable in itself. The generalization applies to socialist industrial 
economy tourists as much as to capitalist judging by observations and views 
expressed in Cairo and Alexandria.
on a Jjrand scale from mrre critical sectors.
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«26. This point was mcde forcibly by Tanzania's Ministry of Tourism in 1970 - 
3ee Tourism and Socialist Development, pp 86-87 and on pp. 72-74 a similar 
statement by a critic of the tourist sector as it existed (albeit not of 
tourism).
27. These comments do not hold for relatively low capital, low scarce resource, 
high labour content service and workshop enterprises, e.g. medium to high 
quality restaurants and "hand-made" quality furniture, so long as they use 
local materials, are among the more desirable amenity and luxury goods (a view 
which production patterns and trends suggest is shared by China). This is not 
an argument for giving such sectors priority over basic goods.
28. The Tanzanian regulations of 1971 did limit new (or under three year old) 
car purchases to individuals and institutions proving a public need (or to 
expatriates paying in foreign exchange). It did cut imports and was enforcea­
ble (prior to a complete ban for foreign exchange reasons in 1974). At least 
some middle managers and civil servants agreed it did save them form a "status 
need" to buy and to run a car they could not afford, and it has raised the 
level and quality of articulation of criticism of public transport.
29. If the elite want no such standards they will block them, tourism or no 
tourism, unless the politicam power alliance can enforce a code of conduct 
on them in which case the removal of temptation may be critical.
30. For example, Tanzanian official survey forms spoke of "Houseboys" and 
"Nursegirls" until 1973. EVen then, while backed by several senior Tanzanian 
officials, the change came from quite a limited number of critics1 demands.
31 • It is perfectly reasonable and possible for a person to relate to his 
secretary and his domestic staff as colleagues and friends, to visit their 
homes, to share their joys and sorrows, to help them humanly (and be helped 
in return) as well as with money, tc keep in contact with some after the job 
relation is over, to be with them in sickness and mourn at their graves.
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The author does state this form personal experience, not pure theorizing, 
wishes he could say it was also usual since to him it seems morally impe­
rative .
32. cf. Shiv.ie in "Tcurism and Socialist, p ix.
33* This is equally true of African literature published with European 
sales in mind but tourists are not a significant book market.
34. The problem can be complex if a social or belief lose, not a material, 
is involved, but genuine dialogue can naturally resolve much issues, e.g. 
one self help water pipeline venture in Tanzania required ceremonial pro­
pitiation and moving cf several local tutelary spirits to secure acceptance 
and support.
35. Foreign currency only facilities are an intermediate solution. They 
are also a rather messy one and may well assist exchange control evasion 
(especially by the upper middle and upper classes) more than they retrieve 
leaking foreign currency, cf. Egyptian experience.
36. The bland assumption that it can cnlj' be from the former reasons
(a thinly disguised example of which appears on pp. 92-93 of Tourism and 
Socialist Development) seems in itself to betray an inferiority complex 
(ibid p.xi). The opposite extreme is illustrated by the Cape Cod bost 
builder letting rooms to summer tourists who, when one ventured to ask 
what he did when thez left, dourly, announced "We fumigate".
37. For example a not untypical Soviet tourist in Alexandria on being 
shown a rather fine Nile tortoise, uttered that classic "Americanism" - 
"Oh, but we have a much bigger one outdoors ih the Moscow Zoo".
38. The elite of course already have a rather less desirable type of
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fringe benefit - the dubiously necessary overseas business, course or con­
ference trip at his employers'expense.
39. Cf. expatriate ex-manager of the Tanzania Tourist Corporation at pp.11-12 
of "Tourism..and Socialist Development".
40. Tourists - especially in groups - all too often show the worst side of 
themselves and the environment from which they come. They quite frequently 
behave (in Europe as well as Africa) in a way they would not do either at 
home or individually.
41. These estimates are in 1974 prices for East Africa. Historic costs are, 
of course, considerably lower.
42. The 15-20 % is for East Africa. With a lower import content, the figure 
would fall and - more critically - with lower taxes and more concessions it 
would well be 5 ^  as it appears to be in Cameroon and Ivory Coast.
43- Including indirect taxes and charges similar to taxes, not simply income 
and company tax.
44. The argument that wildlife preservation is a duty to "the common heritage 
of mankind" does imply that the richer sections of mankind should bear most 
of the cost whether in direct grants or viewing fees.
45. For a fuller explanation of this point see Samir Armin, :,Neo-Colonialism 
in West Africa", Penguin, 1973, P .rt Two and R.H. Green, "The MNC and the 
Peripheral African Ec nomy", IDEP CS/2562-11.
46. Wether a national capitalist tourist sector is practicable is another 
matter. Egyptian experience - which does include a central public sector 
component - is not too premising an example.
V47. e.g. Mitchell, op.cit and F. Thresher cited p.5 "Tourism and Socialist 
Development".
48. This ignores unequal exchange underprincing of the Rosa Luxembourg/
Arghiri Emmanuel type which evidently does exist in tourism.
49. Cf. A .0. Hirshman, "The Strategy of Economic Development," Y le, 1957 ;
R. Rurkse, "Balanced and Unbalanced Growth" (Istanbul Lecture) in "Equilibrium 
and Growth in the World Economy," H.rvard, 1961 ; J. Rweyemamu, "Underdevelop­
ment and industrialization in Tanzania", Oxford, 1973, estp. ch. 6.
50; For a fuller exposition of such a pattern see, C. Thomas "Industrializa­
tion and the Transformation of Africa" IDEP CS/2562—6 and "Dependence and 
transformation", Monthly Review Press (New York), 1974.
51. In Tanzania, the Lake Manyara Hotel uses ever 90 % local food (much grown 
on its own farm) as does the urban AGIP Motel which has the best restaurant 
in Tanzania.
52. There is no reason why African national airlines (if genuinely national) 
cannot negotiate for 50 fo cf charter flight rights and 50 % cf scheduled 
services and seats, nor why they should be unable to sell charters to tour 
operators. The 1972-1974 progress of East African Airways while well
short of those targets, demonstrates what can be achieved and led to a 
substantial not foreign exchange surplus and a swing into profitability. 
However foreign airlines and travel interests and their local allies (often 
including natiohal airline board and managment members) will oppose such 
efforts or call them "premature".
53. There are exceptions - even in Senegal - but these are usually the 
result of an imaginative promoter creating a low cost complex in a rural area 
with a particular European market in mdmd.
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54. The small relative size of an appropriate tourist sector raises 
problems. It is hard tc get non-specialists, whether political or technical, 
to paysserious attention to it which is unfortunate because tourism's 
macro-implications are numerous and complex. If in addition the specialists 
are few in number and inexperienced it is hardly surprising if the plan is 
open to criticism and subsequently needs sweepingsrevision - as has been 
the case in Tanzania.
55. Morocco and Egypt have locational, and Egypt unique historic site 
advantages but they are relatively large economies and both have fairly 
good alternative export development possibilities - at least compared to 
other African states.
56. Tourists, will not come to any but the most world famous historic sites 
(e.g. The Pyramids) for the sites alone (cf. how little tourism Southwest 
Turkey had before beaches were added to the Pergamum, Side, Ephases, 
Laodicea, Attaya, Hieropolis, and Smyrna historic offerings). However, 
sites are good for photographs and conversation and give a feeling of some­
thing worthy done so do add to the appeal of beaches (e.g.Fionician 
Carthage and the Hill where St. Louis died have been some sort of savoury 
to add to the lure of Tunis'beaches).
57. This does not mean no reinvestment in expansion from surplus simply 
that after - say - an initial ten year programm of expansion the sector 
must show positive surplus and foreign exchange transfer^ to the rest of 
the economy after taking investment costs into account.
58. Wether tax revenue is part of investible surplus is partly a matter 
of choice of definition but basically one of whether added government 
revenue generates more recurrent expenditure at higher transfers to 
investment.
59. Two special costs (other than socio-political and political economic)
are use of non-renewable resources and pollution. Tourism does rate 
well (low cost) on the first count, and, with minimal care, better than 
most alternatives on the second.
60. Unless of course one has an elite who fully fit Fmon's definition 
of their role &s compradores, colporteurs, and purveyors to more powerful 
and richer elites and are willing to pursue it. For them the "traditional.1?.1' 
Caribbean pattern is satisfactory. Alternatively, the moderate C03t, "Fresh 
provincial scene in Africa" that typifies the lower middle strata of 
Dakar tourism( and used to do so in Tannanrive) is at least less crude, 
garish and explosive than the C.ribbean pattern, but it is hardly a 
growth sub-sector nor likely to be a very profitable one to try 
to establish elsewhere.
61 . Evidently, curbing tourism would do little to limit demonstration 
effect impact with up to 1 000 000 Yugoslavs working abroad and as many 
returned from foreign work.
62. The comparison is not whimsical. China has given some stress to 
traditional and modern wood, ivory, jade, and amber carving using imparted 
materials and turning out luxury products dominantly for export. This is 
a quite deliberate transformation of skills and labour into wage goods 
(wheat) and producer goods (machinery and technology) via the intermediary 
of luxury exports ba.-sed on imported materials.
6J. There is some reason to suppose that a moderate expansion of the 
foreign visitor sector is being considered in China - presumably to be an 
addition to luxury craft goods as a low scarce resource cost way of meeting 
necessary foreign exchange targets which have risen with recent emphasis 
on quickening technological progress in certain industrial sectors.
*
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*64. Zanzibar under the rather austere populist regime of the late Vice 
President Abeid Karume did hatee tight security and contact control, but it i3 
a small island, had few tourists, and has one basic tourist circuit starting 
and ending at the single airport. (The control of tourist contact is much 
less market to-day).
65. Tanzanian experience suggests that the Tanzania Tourist Corporation is 
usually toe optimistic and too micro oriented and is only partly corrected 
by its parent ministry. The Treasury and the Party (for overlapping albeit 
not identical reasons) take much more macro and critical views of tourism 
and resource allocution to back it. On occasions both have vetoed projects 
for somewhat different reasons at the same time and apparently without any 
prior joint consultation.
66. For a fuller elaboration see R.H. Green "Political Independence and the 
National Economy", in C.Allen and R. Johnson, "African Perspectives",
Cambridge 1970.
67. The Lagos case in which basically local funds are being used to create a 
several million pound project to be controlled and run by an offshoot of 
Occidental Petroleum is an example.
68. African personnel "socialized" into foreign capitalist values will support 
and pursue them by conviction and believed self interest. For example, the 
very able African head board member of a London based MNC with a wealth of 
political and business connections in his home country is a better viceroy 
for the MNCs province there than any European could hope to be.
69. The framework need not be in a single document but if it is too scattered 
then its coherent and consistent operation and internalization is made much more 
difficult and risky. Tanzania's egalitarian income distribution strategy has 
worked without any formal written guidelines but largely beaause of the very 
deep commitment to it of the President and two successive ministers of
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Finance and its consequent internalization as a test of all ( not simply 
fiscal and public expenditure) policy by the Treasury and much of its (wholly 
public sector) financial institution galaxy. This is unlikely to a satisfac­
tory general mcdel for frameworks or guidelines.
0. The idea that second class, tourist type hotels are appropriate is one as 
recurrent as it is unlikely to be correct. Tented camps, simple rooms,
African meals are much more hopeful starting points. Equally, decentralization 
of ownership (whether decentralized public sector units e.g. District Develop­
ment Corporations, quasi public bodies e.g. Vjamaa Villages, Regional Co-opera­
tes, or local private), managment and operation backed by Regional and National 
guideline plans and selective loan and technical assistance facilities 1 
would seem far preferable socially, politically and technically to a single 
centralized operation cf scattered tiny units.
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